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Introduction
In recent decades, feminists have pointed out how prominent ethical theories are
primarily concerned with establishing rules of conduct between strangers who share (or are
theorized as if they share) the same social status. As Claudia Card points out, such theories
outline explicit expectations and rewards of formal relationships; these relationships characterize
formal institutions, such as law and business, and the considerations of upper-class men who
predominate in such institutions. An ethics which focuses on the impersonal application of rules
risks overlooking attentiveness to personal needs, a crucial quality in caring relationships which
women and poorer classes have had primary responsibility for sustaining. For example, women
have had greater pressure than men to be attentive to the particular needs of their children and
households, while poorer workers have had to attend to the idiosyncrasies of their customers and
employers. Moreover, contractarian theories of ethics idealize an equality of status which is not
always possible or desirable: Ethical theories should be able to inform us in how we ought to
treat our children, or how people should take care of others with disabilities.
I will argue that virtue theories can be particularly responsive to these feminist criticisms.
Since a feminist ethical theory must be able to evaluate and critique both women’s and men’s
practical considerations, I will examine how virtue theories emphasize caring qualities (e.g.
personality and emotional sensitivity) alongside some endorsed by contractarian theories (e.g.
justice and impersonal respect). I will then discuss how the virtue of justice can complement
attentiveness to personal needs in fostering personal relationships, by reference to Alison
Jaggar’s connection between large-scale formal institutions and the personal needs which
characterize personal relationships. Furthermore, I will point out how emphasizing moral
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agents’ personal qualities and circumstances can inform conditions for just laws, as exemplified
by Rosalind Hursthouse’s ethical examination of abortion. In these ways, virtue theory can
provide a moral context within which values of justice and care are jointly cultivated.

Part I
In this section, I will outline and develop some criteria for a feminist ethical theory. By
distinguishing between men’s and women’s practical considerations, I will outline how
contractarian ethical theories are selectively drawn from and relevant to men’s practical
considerations, as well as the relationships and institutions which engender such considerations.
In doing so, they fail to address important types of informal and personal relationships which
women have primarily sustained. Finally, to emphasize the importance of both men’s and
women’s ethics, I will outline cases in which informal and personal relationships would benefit
from some of the values endorsed by contractarian theories.
To effectively examine gendered standards in ethical theories, a feminist ethics must be
able to critique both men’s and women’s practical considerations. These considerations differ to
the extent that men and women generally have different social roles, professional commitments,
and relationships upon which their practical reasoning bears. I will refer to men’s practical
considerations as those which are especially relevant to historically male professions and
relationships, such as those of law, business, and academia. Women’s ethical concerns will refer
to those involved in social duties traditionally assumed by women, especially domestic labor
(including child care, elderly care and household tasks such as cooking and cleaning)1 and caring
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One should note that these gendered divisions of labor are less pronounced in non-white families, lower-class
households, and non-heterosexual relationships (Young 1970; Lewis 1975). Where higher-wage jobs are not
primarily available to one family member, financial duties (along with others) may become more distributed, as has
occurred (to some extent) between male and female parents over the last few decades (Pew Research Center, 2013).
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professions2 (such as nursing, teaching, customer service, or other professions which involve a
commitment to attending to another’s needs.)
To examine the implications of these gendered ethical concerns, we should look to the
different practices each set of considerations effects. As Claudia Card notes, women’s practical
considerations are involved in maintaining personal relationships such as those between friends,
spouses, and family members. These relationships are characterized by a mutual concern
between those involved regarding who the others in the relationship are (Card, p.89). This is not
the case in many worker-client relationships, where workers are expected to treat customers with
equal respect and attentiveness, regardless of their personalities. Personal relationships are often
intimate, and the idiosyncrasies of the people involved change the nature of their mutual
attachment and of the relationship itself. Also, personal relationships often grow out of informal
ones which lack strict limitations regarding how and when to act toward others in the
relationship. This freedom to creatively engage with and attend to others allows for people in
informal relationships to ‘really get to know’ each other, and to appreciate another’s subtle
qualities with which one can identify. Informal obligations are fulfilled where one person keenly
cares for another’s psychic, emotional, or biological needs, and this care deepens the relationship
from which such obligations arise.
Formal relationships, on the other hand, are well-defined “in ways that are publicly
understood and publicly sanctioned” (Card, p.89). For example, judges in a U.S. court of law
have certain explicit duties and oaths with respect to the state and people of the court. Formal
relationships are deeply concerned with management, supervision, and accountability. Workers

This does not imply that equal working hours necessarily come with equal domestic responsibilities.
2
See Appendix A for a list of caring professions and the degrees to which women predominate in such fields in the
United States.
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in a corporate hierarchy have explicit responsibilities for which they are hired, specific wages
with which they are compensated, and particular penalties if the work for which they are
contracted is not carried out. Determining precisely the extent to which actions award praise or
penalty defines the domain of distributive justice, as well as formal institutions such as law and
business. Additionally, as Card notes, contractarian and utilitarian ethical theories are primarily
concerned with this type of control, and their characteristic notions of rights and goods derive
from formal institutions of law and business. In these ways, contractarian and utilitarian ethical
theories selectively address men’s practical considerations.
This selectivity comes at two costs. First, ethical theories may fail to appreciate the ways
in which women’s practical considerations can inform our lives. As Card points out, personal,
informal relationships are more foundational than formal ones in the sense that people need them
(e.g. within families) to develop and mature prior to entering formal obligations or many social
institutions. Also, personal relationships are often the source of emotional support which formal
relationships do not provide. In these ways, informal relationships “tend to underlie formal ones,
circumscribe them, come into play when formal ones break down” (Card, p.89).
Second, while the application of contractarian concepts of rights and mutual respect may
prove beneficial in family life, it is inadequate or problematic (for reasons previously discussed).
Nonetheless, there are risks which family members take on when they undervalue the rights and
autonomy3 of each other. For example, Sara Ruddick describes the potential for caregivers to
dominate (i.e. control the opportunities and outcomes of action for) those for whom they care.
3

Here, I use the term autonomy in the traditional sense of one’s independence from the inappropriate interference of
others. Contemporary feminists and philosophers have challenged this notion, pointing out how autonomy can refer
to a deliberative psychological capacity, an ability to recognize and develop human values distinct from immediate
pleasure or pain, or a status in which one can act by self-imposed commitments (Hill, p.30-5). With a broader idea
of autonomy, one can recognize how friends, family or mentors encourage rather than inhibit autonomy.
Nonetheless, the traditional ideal of autonomy (as a right) is embedded in contemporary use; its potential neglect is
what I emphasize here.
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Dominators may “believe that domination is necessary for the eventual happiness and perhaps
even survival of the dominated” (Ruddick, p.214). Ruddick suggests that families, as well as
informal relationships generally, could benefit from a respect for autonomy within the
relationship. This respect is undoubtedly difficult to practice alongside caring for another’s
needs; parents may often override their child’s desires and choices for their child’s long-term
benefit. Nonetheless, respect for autonomy is crucial to build the self-respect and self-esteem
toward which personal relationships partly aim. The restraint which such respect requires is
often associated with ideals of justice closely associated with contractarian theories.
Also associated with such theories is the examination of large-scale political and
economic institutions. Alison Jaggar notes that a potential deficiency of personal relationships is
their lack of attention to such institutions. Instead, the emphasis of these relationships on others’
particular needs can exclude awareness of systematic social injustices which consistently
generate such needs (Jaggar, p.196). Values of justice, derived from formal relationships, and
those of care, rooted in informal and personal ones, are each relevant to ethical theories that aim
broadly to inform human action.

Part II
The need for values of justice and care presents a challenge to existing ethical theories.
Some of these theories can more easily address such a challenge, and I will argue that virtue
theory is especially apt for the purpose. To do so, I will describe virtue theory as an ethical
theory which is distinguished from contractarianism and utilitarianism by its emphasis on
personal development and emotional understanding. To illuminate this emphasis, I will first
highlight the role of friendship in acquiring virtue. Second, I will relate Gabriele Taylor’s
definitions of emotions, moods and character traits. Third, I will outline the importance of both
5

emotion and reason in building practical wisdom, according to Aristotle and David Hume. These
three connections place virtue within a context of personal relationships and emotional
sensitivity.
Virtue theory, like other ethical theories, aims to outline and justify the standards by
which human actions are determined to be correct or not. These standards, and their respective
justifications, distinguish ethical theories from each other. As Rosalind Hursthouse explains,
virtue theory defines correct actions as those which would be undertaken by a virtuous person in
the relevant circumstances, and such a person is one who possesses the virtues: character traits
which humans need to flourish or live well. Two other kinds of ethical theories include
deontological ones, which describe correct actions as those which are in accord with a moral rule
or principle, and utilitarian ones, for which correct actions are those which maximize happiness
(Hursthouse, p.225). Contractarian theories are deontological, since they define correct actions
in terms of individuals’ binding contracts.
Before going further, I will attempt here to resolve and more deeply examine the main
focus of virtue theory, irrespective of its particular contrasts with those of other ethical theories.
One of the central challenges of virtue theory is to distinguish exactly which qualities qualify as
virtues. An issue with delimiting such a classification is that accounts of the virtues have varied,
and such variations are sometimes incompatible with one another. For example, Aristotle notes
the importance of accurate self-assessment in acknowledging one’s own strengths and
weaknesses, while Thomas Aquinas argues for the virtue of humility, in which one focuses
attention primarily on where one is underdeveloped. Homer praises the virtue of physical
strength through heroic poetry, while Benjamin Franklin holds the virtue of utility as that from
which other virtues gain their legitimacy. To trace the impetus which gives rise to these varying
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accounts, Alasdair MacIntyre renders virtues as beneficial to human societies. These societies
are largely dependent upon social practices, which are sustained and developed by some
qualities of their practitioners rather than others. These qualities are virtues.
MacIntyre provides the following definition of social practices:
“By a ‘practice’ I [mean] any coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended” (MacIntyre, p.187).
With this notion, sciences, arts and sports are practices, while a science experiment, an artwork
or a sports competition is not. Similarly, planting a seedling is not a practice, though farming is.
MacIntyre clarifies the idea of internal goods as those which can only be directly experienced
through engaging with the practice in which they are brought about. For example, understanding
why cross-country running can be so enjoyable is difficult without trying to run long distances or
training for similar endurance events. Furthermore, their achievement is a benefit for the entire
community that engages with the practice: Maxwell’s formulation of classical electrodynamics,
in which light maintains constant speed, prepared the whole community of physicists for the later
advances of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Internal goods contrast with external goods, which
are acquired and owned exclusively by certain individuals, typically at a loss to others.
Examples of external goods are trophies in a chess tournament and cash grants awarded for
scientific publications. In essence, virtues are acquired human qualities which aid people in their
cooperation to sustain and advance social practices of which human societies are constituted
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(MacIntyre, p.187-91).
MacIntyre’s concepts of virtue and social practices are designed to unify the various
accounts of virtue throughout history by highlighting their common underlying ideas—that
virtues are crucially beneficial for individuals and communities, and that people can and should
strive to exercise them. MacIntyre’s encompassing account of virtue also avoids taking up the
misogyny and classism of particular virtue theorists (most notably Aristotle), a crucial correction
if virtue theory is to be feminist. For these two reasons, I will rely on MacIntyre’s basic account
in further discussion of the virtues.
There are a few features of virtue theory which are relevant to discuss virtue theory’s
exceptional adaptiveness to the previously noted feminist criticisms. First, virtue theory is
autocentric, in that it emphasizes the importance of self-cultivation and personal development in
attaining good character (Taylor 2006). In other words, virtue ethics contextualizes actions
within the agent’s patterned desires and deliberations4. The emphasis on autocentrism contrasts
deontological and utilitarian theories, which treat isolated decisions as instances for the
application of universally applicable rules or calculations. In order to act well, according to
virtue theory, one must develop and maintain the virtues; to progress in this respect, one must
also have an accurate assessment of one’s own successes and weaknesses. Good friends aid us
in this assessment. As Aristotle points out, good friends find pleasure in each other’s good
actions (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.VIII, Ch. 3, §6): Where one succeeds, the other is proud; where
one falls short, the other is likely to notice. To be sensitive to each other’s values, desires and
4

The assumption that these long-term patterns actually exist and primarily govern our motivations for action has
been undermined by recent work in experimental psychology (Doris 2002). This “globalist thesis” holds robust
dispositions as the determinants of our actions, yet John Doris has documented how several morally salient decisions
(e.g. whether to offer help to a fallen stranger) are strongly influenced by apparently small changes in circumstance
(e.g. finding a dime beforehand, or running a few minutes late for a meeting.) While such findings elucidate risk in
the hasty attribution of character traits, they do not rule out the possibility of obtaining such traits (with vigilance) on
a path toward virtue.
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practical reasoning, friends require “time and familiarity” with each other. This time is spent
attending to each other’s personal abilities, values and concerns. In this way, virtue theory
endorses a self-understanding and development which is fostered by personal relationships.
Along with individuals’ personal qualities, virtue theory emphasizes emotionality, a
second characteristic of informal relationships which women have had primary responsibility for
maintaining. As mentioned previously, personal and informal relationships often provide
emotional and social support which may be lacking in formal institutions. For example, a
distraught worker may well rather express his worries of his mother’s health with a close friend
than with his colleagues.
To understand the impact of this emotional support, I will outline an account of emotions
which relates them to the character traits with which virtue theory is primarily concerned. As
Gabriele Taylor argues, emotions involve a cognitive assessment of the world. For example, fear
of a dog may derive from the belief that the dog may bite. The intentional self to which such
assessments refer is the ‘internal object’ which constitutes the emotion. To use the previous
example, I may be fearful not merely that a dog may bite, but that I, or someone, or something
which I value or care about, may be bitten. Emotions, therefore, are characterized by
relationships between one’s perceptions and intentions (Taylor, p.13-4).
Emotions also can have particular ‘external objects’ toward which our perceptions are
directed (e.g. a dog). However, these external objects do not necessarily motivate emotion, as is
the case in what are commonly called ‘moods’ (Taylor, p.14). Depression, for instance, does not
focus its pessimism on any particular aspect of the world, but instead dims all prospects
indiscriminately. To the extent that moods are long-lasting and strongly influence other moods,
emotions and behavior, they may be called personality traits. Personality traits may be classified
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as character traits if their possessor has responsibility for their perpetuation; on the other hand,
some personality traits are environmentally or genetically determined (Taylor, p.16).
On this conception, character traits are inseparable from our emotional tendencies.
Emotional sensitivity is therefore helpful for one to understand both our own and others’
motivations for action. With such an understanding, one may better correct oneself and the
company with whom he or she pursues the virtues. This emotional correction is essential to
Aristotle’s conception of virtue; he writes that “[virtue] is about feelings and actions, and these
admit of excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition….[H]aving these feelings at the right
times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is
the intermediate and best condition” (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 6, §10-11). In contrast,
contractarian ethics either do not consider emotion as playing a role in the application of their
characteristic moral rules, or they relegate emotion as a risk to the diligent application of such
rules. Even regarding friendship, Kant asserts that “it is never for a moment safe from
interruptions if it is allowed to rest on feelings…[T]he love in friendship cannot be an affect; for
emotion is blind in its choice, and after a while it goes up in smoke” (Kant, p.586). Here, Kant
discredits emotions as volatile and threatening, rather than potential foundations for long-term
commitments.
Similar to Aristotle, David Hume recognizes the capacity to shape our own emotional
motivations with reflective reasoning. Hume maps two sources for moral knowledge: (1)
rational deduction, by which people appeal to reason and proof to explain why a particular
course of action is morally acceptable, and (2) affective attraction: moral qualities (e.g.
generosity) are said to be amiable rather than odious, and our desires for moral qualities act as
the motive force in sustaining moral activity. This two-part moral evaluation allows for emotion
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to give our study of virtues the tendency to regulate and enrich our actions, while permitting
deliberative argumentation to shape and correct our emotional perceptions. In a similar fashion,
emotional appreciation of fine arts is acquired through practice and careful, perceptive
discernment (Hume, p.14-5). Hume holds that this dialogue between emotion and reason can
direct us as individuals and communities toward better lives. Virtue theory, distinguished by its
emphasis on personal reform toward virtuous character traits, relies on this dialogue.

Part III
Here, I will show how virtue theories motivate the development of just action which can
arise from a contractarian concept of justice. To give an outline of this concept, I will draw upon
the account of one of its most noteworthy contemporary theorists, John Rawls. I will then
compare the guiding principles which follow from his fundamental axioms with the practical
dispositions of a virtuous agent, as described by Alasdair MacIntyre.
The term justice has been used across a variety of times, places, and academic and
professional disciplines. To provide a standard for evaluating concepts of justice, John Rawls
asserts that just associations are characteristically fair in that they are guided by principles which
would be collectively chosen by free, equal, rational persons prior to or without knowledge of
their associations (Rawls, p.11). The “original position” is a situation in which such free, equal,
rational people are ignorant of their respective places in society, yet deliberating about the basic
rules and terms of their future associations. Concepts of justice are more or less accurate to the
extent that they reflect the choices of people in the original position. Just societies implement
the guiding principles which define an accurate conception of justice.
Rawls elaborates on what qualifies people as free, equal, and rational in the original
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position:
“[They are] situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various
alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles
solely on the basis of general considerations….[N]o one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, p.136-7).
Rawls places these restrictions on the original position in order to prevent agents from choosing
principles that would enable them to exploit contingent circumstances of society to their own
advantage (Rawls, p.136). For example, if a wealthy businessman knew that he would benefit
from lenient tax laws and environmental regulations, he would likely be tempted to make such
laws or diminish divisions between business and government. Alternatively, where people are
ignorant of their future (or actual) privilege or misfortune, they may focus their concerns on the
welfare of each person in society. This focus can in turn safeguard fairness in the social
distribution of goods and opportunities.
Rawls further argues that agents in the original position would agree upon two main
principles. First, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.” Second, “social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b)
attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls, p.60). Rawls emphasizes the priority of the
first principle over the second: as societies become more developed, obstacles to the exercise of
the liberties decline and the right to pursue freedom of thought and expression becomes more
significant. Since agents in the original position do not know their own life plans, their decisions
will be motivated in light of the desire for liberty and the expectation that this desire grows as
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people’s basic wants are fulfilled (Rawls, p.543). Additionally, the second principle requires
that, regarding a just inequality, the representative person in society reasonably prefers his or her
prospects with the inequality rather than those without it. This requirement permits fewer
infringements of liberty than the principle of utility alone, which assumes that the gains by some
compensate for the losses of others (Rawls, p.64-5).
Rawls argues for all social primary goods, including liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect, to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored (Rawls, p.303). This general
rule would be agreed upon by agents in the original position which is constructed to preserve the
sense of fairness with which justice is closely associated. Rawls’ account of justice serves as a
means by which to measure justice in societies and their institutions, and it provides a goal
toward which social policies could aim.
While Rawls’ account of justice involves the postulation of principles from a hypothetical
scenario of rational agents, it does not precisely describe how justice can be practiced as a virtue.
If defining features of Rawlsian justice, together with their emphasis on fair economic and legal
institutions, are supported by justice as a virtue, then virtue theory is capable of informing formal
institutions and relationships in which men have been predominant. Here, I will clarify the
notion of justice in the context of virtue theory.
To understand how justice can manifest in virtue theory, we should first return to
MacIntyre’s definition of a virtue: acquired human traits which tend to enable us in the
acquisition of internal goods definitive of social practices. As MacIntyre points out, there are
three virtues which are crucial for sustaining these practices: courage, or the willingness to take
on risks for developing oneself and one’s practice, honesty, or the ability to acknowledge one’s
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own faults and care for truthfulness in one’s relationships, and justice, or the ability to recognize
what is due to whom (e.g. in a team or organization) (MacIntyre, p.191).
Knowing “what is due to whom” involves an awareness of social obligations. These
obligations are moral to the extent that they arise from the practitioners’ need to reliably assist
each other in cooperatively sustaining their social practices. Within practices, such obligations
may include acknowledgment of the authority of practitioners from whom one may learn, respect
and courtesy toward one’s peers, and willingness to teach others where one is able. Each of
these obligations depends upon a sense of relative skill or merit within a practice or organization:
In MacIntyre’s terms, they rely upon those standards of excellence toward which practitioners
collectively strive and attempt to focus. A practice falters when authority is given to those who
do not look after its standards or its people.
The danger of illegitimate authority is examined by MacIntyre as he traces the role of
social institutions in maintaining social practices (MacIntyre, p.194). Institutions are primarily
concerned with external goods, the security of which is necessary for steadily paying the costs of
a practice as they arise. Medical professionals need hospitals and clinics, while professors and
students require schools and universities. A lack of these institutions is detrimental to their
respective practices: Where money dries up, public resources dwindle, and practitioners lack
benefits or a central location which eases their communication and stabilizes their commitment.
While institutions aim toward external goods, however, the practices which they support seek
internal goods. These different aims may draw conflict where internal goods are undervalued by
institutional administration. For example, professors hired primarily based upon their likelihood
to attract grant money may lack the ability to communicate with and educate university students.
In such a situation, the practice of education suffers.

14

Justice, then, thought of as a virtue which consists in the knowledge of social obligations
that involves the recognition of practices’ standards of excellence, is a character trait of
individuals. Justice on Rawls’ account, on the other hand, is a property of a social system
(including its practices, institutions and activities) which involves a distribution of goods (and
freedoms) to the greatest benefit of the least fortunate people involved and which arises from
fundamental principles agreed upon in a hypothetical original position. These two definitive
qualities of justice, though distinct, can be mutually supportive. Where people are respectful,
aware of their own deficiencies, and praising of each other’s achievements, they are more apt to
arrange organizational positions so that these achievements are encouraged—so that they are
open to all with equality of opportunity. Conversely, recognition and correction of systematic
injustice, such as that of discrimination5, can lead individuals to become more respectful and see
each other in terms of his or her character. Just people make for just societies, and vice versa.
We have so far established that virtue theory renders personal development, emotional
sensitivity, and awareness of social obligations as hallmarks of the virtuous agent. These
qualities manifest in caring and just individuals, who seek the well-being of other people and the
establishment of just practices and institutions. Since virtue theory provides ideals and measures
of justice and of caring qualities, it is well-suited to evaluate men’s and women’s practical
considerations.

Part IV
In this section, I will examine concrete ways in which justice and care can be jointly and

5

Jennifer Saul Mather (2003) has distinguished between two notions of discrimination. One involves solely those
actions which arbitrarily take into account one’s race, gender, sexual orientation, or other identification in granting
awards or responsibilities. Another definition regards discrimination as actions that perpetuate social, political or
economic disparities which are delineated based upon such identifications. The latter is the definition I use here.
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constructively cultivated. First, I will revisit Alison Jaggar’s warning that personal relationships
are often maintained at the exclusion of attending to large-scale socioeconomic institutions. In
doing so, I will show how personal relationships may be strengthened by developing a sense of
justice with which one may insightfully critique the political systems that bear upon those for
whom one cares. Second, I will explain Rosalind Hursthouse’s normative account of abortion to
focus on how justice can be informed by attentiveness to personal needs, a quality typical of
personal relationships.
As mentioned previously, Alison Jaggar illuminates how personal relationships are
concerned with others’ personal needs and well-being. If such concern is not supplemented with
attention to large social institutions which broadly influence human activity, then many of the
needs of those for whom one cares may be left continually unmet. Alternatively,
acknowledgment of political and social patterns allows one to recognize injustice in social
systems and take actions toward correcting it. Where these injustices are corrected, people’s
needs can be better addressed. For example, a teacher of homeless children may fight for
reforms of government-sponsored foster care for the sake of her students. By practicing the
virtue of justice, one can become more sensitive to political practices that endanger or safeguard
the interests of those for whom they care. Justice, then, can help one fulfill the informal
obligations which characterize personal relationships. Since such fulfillment strengthens and
enriches personal bonds (as mentioned in Part I), justice can complement emotional and personal
attentiveness in deepening personal relationships.
At the same time, attentiveness to personal needs may inform requirements for just laws
and practices. In Rosalind Hursthouse’s “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, she examines how virtue
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ethics directs one toward particular considerations in evaluating the morality6 of abortion—
considerations which are not commonly taken into account during discussions on the matter.
There are primarily two contentious issues which are commonly understood as most relevant in
the moral evaluation of abortion: the metaphysical status of the fetus (particularly, “whether or
not it is the sort of thing that may or may not be innocuously or justifiably killed”) and women’s
rights (Hursthouse, p.233-4). Hursthouse notes that, though women’s rights to choose abortion
are important in political dialogue, rights to choices of action do not entail the morality of such
choices. One may exercise one’s right to free speech to spread racism, or one’s right to privacy
to avoid intimacy with family or friends. The metaphysical status of the fetus, on the other hand,
is a highly contentious issue among academic philosophers and theologians, rather than a kind of
wisdom which is, like all virtues, accessible to people who do not embark on such specialized
inquiries7.
Rather, the metaphysical details which are significant to the virtue theorist’s examination
of abortion are what Hursthouse describes as “the familiar biological facts”: “that, standardly
(but not invariably), pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual intercourse, that it lasts about nine
months, during which time the fetus grows and develops, that standardly it terminates in the birth
of a living baby, and that this is how we all come to be” (p.236). These familiar facts are
important to the extent that they factor into the actions, decisions, emotions, and desires of the
virtuous and of the non-virtuous. A shift in perspective moves attention toward the emotional

6

Hursthouse emphasizes that her argument is not intended to evaluate “the rights and wrongs of laws prohibiting or
permitting [abortion]” (p.234). However, if laws are to be informed by what is and is not moral, then providing a
richer moral evaluation of abortion can better inform the laws which supervene on it. Hursthouse suggests the
possible legal implications of her arguments where she writes, “If we suppose that women do have a moral right to
do as they choose with their own bodies, or, more particularly, to terminate their pregnancies, then it may well
follow that a law forbidding abortion would be unjust” (p.234).
7

That philosophical sophistication is unnecessary for virtue is an assumption of virtue theory, as Hursthouse notes
(p.235), and I will not attempt to defend that assumption here.
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strength, depth, and longevity of the relationships that pregnancies normally bring about—those
between parents and their offspring—as well as the care that such relationships require. The
premature termination of a pregnancy is, “in some sense, the cutting off of a new human life” (p.
237). To terminate a pregnancy, then, is to connect with our understandings of life and death8,
family relationships, and parenthood—these matters should not be taken lightly. To take them
lightly is to disregard them in one’s practical considerations where they have bearing on others’
and one’s own emotions and lives. Parenthood is a greatly worthwhile activity9 which can
constitute part of a flourishing human life, and one is “callous and light-minded” where one
rejects this activity for grossly materialistic, shortsighted or shallow reasons (p. 241).
Parenthood may nonetheless be rejected for good reasons: Where women are in poor
physical health, or are utterly exhausted, or have jobs which demand difficult physical labor (e.g.
coal mining), they do not dismiss parenthood lightly in preventing the physical distress which
full-term pregnancy and birth bring along. When women already have children for whom they
are unsure they can effectively care with another child, they are not undervaluing the importance
of motherhood. These cases demonstrate where women may be virtuous in addressing the
gravity of their situations while ultimately deciding to terminate their pregnancies. Even where
such decisions are well-founded, the lack of good working conditions or material resources
which bring them about may point to broader social needs that should be addressed to make

8

Exactly how we are to regard the nature of life and death as applied to a fetus seems to be a salient goal of
questioning its metaphysical status. Nonetheless, Hursthouse’s examination brings to light the importance of family
relationships and personal circumstances—aspects which are not entailed by the metaphysical status of the fetus—in
understanding the morality of abortion. Considerations of emotional relationships and personal circumstances can
be well understood with reference to ‘the familiar biological facts’.
9

Hursthouse defends this notion more thoroughly in her book, Beginning Lives (1987). To summarize her main
point briefly, the value of parenthood derives primarily from the values of love, of family life, and of enriching
emotional development throughout one’s life. Parents not only foster these values in their own lives, but in those
who are an intimate part of it—grandparents, siblings, and relatives who can learn to live with and care for a new
addition to the family.
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parenthood more accessible for those who would prefer it (p. 240).
Additionally, one may feel that one is simply not yet ready for parenthood. This
readiness can be a measure of one’s personal development, or of one’s strength, independence,
resoluteness, responsibility, serious-mindedness, and self-confidence. While one may rightly
acknowledge one’s own lack of development in making a decision to terminate a pregnancy, this
lack can itself be a moral failing. Alternatively, one may have other worthwhile things to do
which are incompatible with being a parent—after all, raising children takes much time, effort,
and money, to say the least. Still, one should be cautious not to fool oneself into thinking that
comparatively worthwhile things are abundant where they are not (p. 242, 244).
Whether or not abortion is a virtuous decision, then, strongly depends upon the
motivations, reasoning, and circumstances of the person who considers it as a course of action.
If legal principles are to be derived from moral ones, then laws concerning abortion should allow
for a variety of choices from which people in very different circumstances can consider the most
worthwhile courses of action. To determine whether an action is worthwhile, one must examine
one’s emotional, biological, psychological, material, economic, and familial needs and
circumstances. Justice, then, can be informed by an attentiveness to personal needs.
In this section, I have demonstrated how virtues of justice and personal relationships can
be simultaneously developed. As Alison Jaggar highlights, effectively caring for someone in a
personal relationship can involve a sensitivity to just social practices and institutions which
affect one’s life and well-being. Additionally, as Rosalind Hursthouse explains, attention to the
needs of people from diverse circumstances can help reform and construct just laws which
respond to those needs. In these ways, justice and care can be not only independently desirable,
but also mutually cooperative.
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Conclusions
We have examined how virtue theory, unlike deontological and utilitarian theories, places
a greater emphasis on agents’ emotionality and personal development, two features which render
it suitable to inform human activity in personal relationships. To the extent that informal
relationships “tend to underlie formal ones” (Card, p.89) and “domestic life is not an elective but
an essential practice for human flourishing” (Okin, p.219), virtues which foster personal and
informal relationships are of great importance in human life. Virtue theory’s inclusion of these
virtues alongside more traditional ones of justice and respect enables it to address both men’s
and women’s values in practical considerations. The distinction between men’s and women’s
values, as mentioned previously, is not meant to reinforce gender stereotyping in ethical
decision-making. Rather, by distinguishing between (1) the values involved in those
relationships definitive of formal institutions in which men have predominated, and (2) those
characteristically involved in relationships of domestic labor and caring professions for which
women have had primary responsibility, we might more keenly avoid biases in ethical standards
which ignore the importance of actions, skills, and people in one of these domains. Virtue theory
can help us to do so.
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